— By Hemin H Lihony in Sulaimaniyah
A fierce political battle is underway to determine who will lead Iraq’s new government. The prime minister’s post, the most powerful and coveted position in Iraq, is at the heart of intense negotiations between the country’s top political alliances.
The prime minister will lead Iraq through one of the most critical periods in Iraq’s modern history. The United States military withdrawal will be a major test for Iraq’s forces and its government.
In addition to security, the new prime minister will need to build stronger relations with Iraq’s allies and address domestic challenges, including corruption, services, economic development and national reconciliation. The future of the country will lie in his hands.
The top contenders have all served as prime minister, but re-electing them would be a mistake. In light of the serious issues that Iraq will face – and the political divisiveness of former leaders – Iraq’s best option is to choose a fresh face to serve as the country’s new leader.
A new leader will bring a sense of hope and optimism which are in dire need in Iraq today.
Iraq’s last three former prime ministers – Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki – failed to bring stability, tackle corruption and promote national reconciliation. They all sowed mistrust between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds.
Allawi, whose Iraqiya bloc won the parliamentary election by a narrow margin, had a chance to serve as a great leader when he was appointed interim prime minister from 2004 until 2005. But even with the support of the Americans, he could not bring stability to Iraq and instead destroyed Fallujah and Sunni strongholds.
He couldn’t achieve national reconciliation. Now the Kurds, the Shia and Iran are wary of his support from former Baathists.
Jaafari, who heads a relatively small Shia party, has emerged as one of the contenders after winning a referendum by supporters of the radical Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr. Jaafari’s 13-month tenure was marked by a Sunni boycott of the government, mistrust among Kurds, widespread kidnappings and sectarian discord. Under his leadership, Iraq was on the verge of a civil war.
Incumbent premier Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition, made a lot of enemies, especially with neighbouring countries. Rather than inviting Arab states to support Iraq politically and economically, he accused them of interfering in Iraqi affairs but never spoke of Iran.
He blamed Saudi Arabia and Syria for supporting terrorism after major bombings. He had trouble with Sunni Arabs and his leadership created schisms even within the Shia. He could not even win over Kurds, who saved his government from dissolving.
His decision to bring Iraqi forces to areas disputed between Kurds and Arabs inflamed tensions between the two ethnic groups.
Re-electing any of these three leaders will take Iraq back to square one. The former prime ministers currently jockeying for the post should recognise that it is in Iraq’s best interest to compromise by stepping aside and allowing parliament to elect a new prime minister.
Out of respect for the will of people and democracy, the new prime minister should be from one of the winning lists – either State of Law, which won 89 parliamentary seats, or Iraqiya, which gained 91.
Even if he has not served before, an endorsement from a strong list will automatically give a new leader enormous respect and influence.
Maliki and Allawi are the front-runners in the competition and won the most votes of any candidate in Iraq. But this is because they held power, were well-known. In fact, more than 80 per cent of newly-elected legislators are new faces in the assembly, an indication that Iraqis want fresh politicians in power.
We have to ask ourselves why Maliki and Allawi want to be prime minister, and who would be best for the country. The two leaders are seeking another chance to hold power, even though they did not use it wisely in the past.
If they want stability for Iraq, they need to stop their quest for the premiership. Compromising and electing a new person to the post will cast them in a positive light and would also be good for Iraq.
Given their chequered histories many parties eye Maliki and Allawi with suspicion. Heavy political jockeying is under way as they try to secure support from wary potential allies.
A new candidate will not face such hurdles. To be sure, the nominee will need to be an experienced politician who is accepted by Iraq’s most influential parties and groups. He should not have a history of divisiveness and should not be antagonistic. He should be willing and able to fend off foreign influence.
A fresh face will make people optimistic and prove that Iraq has new politicians, and is not always in the hands of a small group of leaders. Neighbouring countries will also give him a chance before judging him.
We need someone who can garner the support of Shia, Sunni and Kurds. A new leader will have a better chance of negotiating with rival political parties and forming a national unity government.
This is crucial for the future of Iraq, as history has shown us that a government cannot function unless all of the major parties and groups are involved in decision-making.
The new prime minister will have to deal with national reconciliation, corruption and security. The old leaders failed to achieve these goals, and if they are re-elected by parliament, Iraqis will only remember the past.
Hemin H Lihony is an IWPR Iraq local editor based in Sulaimaniyah.
Monday, April 26, 2010
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Post-Election Political Deadlock Expected
By Hemin H Lihony and Ali Kareem
Iraq is headed for a post-election political deadlock that could lead to security problems and deepen sectarian rifts, politicians and analysts say.
The Iraqi constitution states that a new government should be formed within a month of election results being certified. But the usual delays caused by parties horse-trading over the creation of a ruling coalition will be exacerbated this time around because there is likely to be good deal of protracted deal-making over the appointment of a president who, unlike in the past, will have substantial power.
Some politicians and analysts worry that the power vacuum could be exploited by extremists.
“Al-Qaeda looks for any opening to commit attacks,” Adil Barwari, a member of the security and defence parliamentary committee, said. “The post-election period is a perfect time for them. There will be a political vacuum, but hopefully not a security one, because the government and especially security ministries are tasked with handling security until the formation of the new government.”
The United States has pushed for a new government to be formed as soon as possible, and American military officials warned this week that attacks could escalate if political horse-trading stalls progress. US commanders have also hinted in recent weeks that combat forces might remain in Iraq past the August 2010 withdrawal date if the elections are followed by bloodshed, as in 2005.
“If al-Qaeda commits attacks this time, then it is up to the next government to decide whether it is necessary to ask American troops to stay and delay the withdrawal plan or not," Barwarai said. "It also depends on the next political blocs in the parliament and their strategies and views. This is not just a security decision, it is also a political one.”
Because no one party is expected to win the 163 seats in Iraq's 325-seat parliament needed to form a government, a complex process of deal-making and coalition-building will precede the selection of a prime minister and the approval of a cabinet.
"I am sure forming the new government will take months,” Azad Chalak, a member of the Iraqi parliament's integrity committee, said. “The reason is the mistrust between Iraqi politicians. It will be very difficult for the new government to get a vote of confidence in the next Iraqi parliament.
“Even a Shia-led government cannot get through parliament easily. Before they were united, but now they have different, separate lists, and it’s the same with the Kurds and Sunnis.
“Any delays in forming a government after the poll [will] make the problems of Iraqis worse. The threat of attacks is one thing, but Iraq also badly needs services and investment. Actually, the country cannot bear deadlock again.”
The government formation process will be furthered complicated with the end of the so-called transitional phase of Iraq's constitution, which will expire after the March 7 election. The 2004 charter, approved overwhelmingly in a 2005 referendum, provided for a three-person presidential council as a means of stabilising Iraq's ethno-sectarian disputes until 2010.
There was an unofficial agreement that the council - which had the power to send new legislation back to parliament up to three times before its passed - would consist of one Shia, one Sunni and one Kurd.
But this council will be dissolved after the March 7 election. In the future, there will still be one president and two vice-presidents, but the three will no longer make decisions by consensus. The president will assume the powers of the council.
The president and his deputies will be elected separately by parliament with a 50 per cent-plus-one majority of parliamentary votes, instead of two-thirds as was required in the past.
The removal of this supermajority approval was meant to make the election of these officials easier and hence speed up the formation of a new leadership.
But there’s likely to be even more protracted negotiation over the post of president than in the past because it will have more power, with Shia, Sunni and Kurdish politicians all vying to make sure that one of their own is appointed.
“The single presidency will create more problems,” said Sami Atrushi, member of the Iraqi parliament's legal affairs committee, who believes the transitional phase is still needed to maintain stability. “The Sunnis and Kurds have started a fierce campaign to try to secure this position before the election. I worry about what will happen after the poll.”
Forming a new government took almost five months following the 2005 elections, and some experts believe that this new political framework will not prevent similar months of confusion and delay.
“I am not optimistic about forming government in one month as hoped for by the constitution," said Atrushi. "This time many coalitions are after the prime minister position, so it is not easy to form government and maintain the relations of the different communities as well. I believe we will see a political crisis after the poll. In fact, this change [to the presidential council] may make sectarian and ethnic problems worse.”
Ali Kareem is an IWPR-trained journalist in Baghdad. Hemin H Lihony is IWPR’s local editor in Sulaimaniyah.
Iraq is headed for a post-election political deadlock that could lead to security problems and deepen sectarian rifts, politicians and analysts say.
The Iraqi constitution states that a new government should be formed within a month of election results being certified. But the usual delays caused by parties horse-trading over the creation of a ruling coalition will be exacerbated this time around because there is likely to be good deal of protracted deal-making over the appointment of a president who, unlike in the past, will have substantial power.
Some politicians and analysts worry that the power vacuum could be exploited by extremists.
“Al-Qaeda looks for any opening to commit attacks,” Adil Barwari, a member of the security and defence parliamentary committee, said. “The post-election period is a perfect time for them. There will be a political vacuum, but hopefully not a security one, because the government and especially security ministries are tasked with handling security until the formation of the new government.”
The United States has pushed for a new government to be formed as soon as possible, and American military officials warned this week that attacks could escalate if political horse-trading stalls progress. US commanders have also hinted in recent weeks that combat forces might remain in Iraq past the August 2010 withdrawal date if the elections are followed by bloodshed, as in 2005.
“If al-Qaeda commits attacks this time, then it is up to the next government to decide whether it is necessary to ask American troops to stay and delay the withdrawal plan or not," Barwarai said. "It also depends on the next political blocs in the parliament and their strategies and views. This is not just a security decision, it is also a political one.”
Because no one party is expected to win the 163 seats in Iraq's 325-seat parliament needed to form a government, a complex process of deal-making and coalition-building will precede the selection of a prime minister and the approval of a cabinet.
"I am sure forming the new government will take months,” Azad Chalak, a member of the Iraqi parliament's integrity committee, said. “The reason is the mistrust between Iraqi politicians. It will be very difficult for the new government to get a vote of confidence in the next Iraqi parliament.
“Even a Shia-led government cannot get through parliament easily. Before they were united, but now they have different, separate lists, and it’s the same with the Kurds and Sunnis.
“Any delays in forming a government after the poll [will] make the problems of Iraqis worse. The threat of attacks is one thing, but Iraq also badly needs services and investment. Actually, the country cannot bear deadlock again.”
The government formation process will be furthered complicated with the end of the so-called transitional phase of Iraq's constitution, which will expire after the March 7 election. The 2004 charter, approved overwhelmingly in a 2005 referendum, provided for a three-person presidential council as a means of stabilising Iraq's ethno-sectarian disputes until 2010.
There was an unofficial agreement that the council - which had the power to send new legislation back to parliament up to three times before its passed - would consist of one Shia, one Sunni and one Kurd.
But this council will be dissolved after the March 7 election. In the future, there will still be one president and two vice-presidents, but the three will no longer make decisions by consensus. The president will assume the powers of the council.
The president and his deputies will be elected separately by parliament with a 50 per cent-plus-one majority of parliamentary votes, instead of two-thirds as was required in the past.
The removal of this supermajority approval was meant to make the election of these officials easier and hence speed up the formation of a new leadership.
But there’s likely to be even more protracted negotiation over the post of president than in the past because it will have more power, with Shia, Sunni and Kurdish politicians all vying to make sure that one of their own is appointed.
“The single presidency will create more problems,” said Sami Atrushi, member of the Iraqi parliament's legal affairs committee, who believes the transitional phase is still needed to maintain stability. “The Sunnis and Kurds have started a fierce campaign to try to secure this position before the election. I worry about what will happen after the poll.”
Forming a new government took almost five months following the 2005 elections, and some experts believe that this new political framework will not prevent similar months of confusion and delay.
“I am not optimistic about forming government in one month as hoped for by the constitution," said Atrushi. "This time many coalitions are after the prime minister position, so it is not easy to form government and maintain the relations of the different communities as well. I believe we will see a political crisis after the poll. In fact, this change [to the presidential council] may make sectarian and ethnic problems worse.”
Ali Kareem is an IWPR-trained journalist in Baghdad. Hemin H Lihony is IWPR’s local editor in Sulaimaniyah.
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