kurdish Official Discourse Should Change From Kirkuk for Kurdistan to Kirkuk for Kirkukis, a US professor says

Hemin Hussein heminhussein@yahoo.com

US professor, Denis Natali believes that the Iraqi government does not respect the Constitution and all its articles. When it comes to the Kirkuk issue and article 140, she says that "It is no surprise or secret that most Arabs and regional states are against a referendum in Kirkuk." However, she also adds that "instead of trying to convince these opponents or explain why it is in their interest to have a referendum, the KRG has largely focused on Kurdish populations. The official discourse should change from Kirkuk for Kurdistan to Kirkuk for Kirkukis". Dr. Denis Natali is an American political scientist currently teaching Comparative Politics at the University of Kurdistan-Hawler. She is an expert in the Kurds and has followed Kurdish issue for about two decades. She is also an honorary fellow at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Exeter University. How do you see the current tension between the Kurds and Central Government over Khanaqin? These tensions are a byproduct of the post-Saddam regime change and failure of the central government to recognize the constitutional rights of the Kurds, the territorial boundaries of the Kurdistan region, and the legitimacy of the Kurdistan Regional Government to protect its territory. They also reflect Baghdad’s disinterest in and refusal to implement article 140, which should clarify the territorial boundahrries and administrative status of the numerous disputed territories, of which Khanaqin is a part. Indeed, there may be some important security issues that involve heightened troops as part of the effort to stabilize insecure regions. But I think the larger issue is to further complicate the processes of a future referendum. Masud Barzani, President of Kurdistan region, said that he doubts being the Kurds a real partner in the central Government? What do you think? Yes. This is correct. The Kurds are not a real partner in the Iraqi government or the state. When significant meetings and decisions must be made regarding the Kurdistan region, Kurdish leaders are not invited or are told after the fact. Even though the constitution has legalized power-sharing and recognized the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the real power is muted. Worse still, any partnership that may have existed with the central government – even in its partial form – has deteriorated since 2003 so that the Kurds are likely to see their influence and power weaken further as time passes and Arab communities in Baghdad become better organized. Many think that the Kurds now have not any cards to play in Iraq? What do you make of this? I would say that the Kurds do not have the best hand in the card game at the moment, certainly not as they did immediately after the overthrow of Saddam. But they have some leverage still in Iraq, particularly as it relates to economic development, maintaining regional stability, and controlling the PKK. The Kurds and the Kurdistan region are also one of the few regions in the Middle East that has a positive relationship with the US government and can be counted on as a regional ally. One also needs to examine what it is that the KRG and the Kurds are seeking in order to assess the nature of this leverage. If they are attempting to get article 140 implemented, than one can say that this leverage has declined. However, they can also change their tactics as a means of gaining greater support for their side. But if the objective is to increase, if not monopolize regional stability and economic development, then they can and should play this card, which is still strong. In your point of view, who should be blamed for not annexing Kirkuk by the Kurds since 2003? Cleary, if one reads the constitution of Iraq literally, then one can blame the central government for not respecting the constitution and implementing its articles in full. However, the Kirkuk issue is quite complex and cannot be attributed to one major actor. The Kurds have also not played their cards as well as they could have, particularly in the handling of the ‘election’ or lack there-of, of the provincial council in Kirkuk, the monopolization of power and influence by the two main political parties, the competition between the parties in the city, and the failure to appeal to the larger non-Kurdish community to gain their support. It is no surprise or secret that most Arabs and regional states are against a referendum in Kirkuk. Instead of trying to convince these opponents or explain why it is in their interest to have a referendum, the KRG has largely focused on Kurdish populations. The official discourse should change from Kirkuk for Kurdistan to Kirkuk for Kirkukis. If local populations in Kirkuk are becoming critical of their situation and of the Kurdish political parties, this is not Baghdad’s fault. Then one can also look at the influence of the government of Turkey, which also has intervened with the Turcoman populations and western powers, to impede a referendum. But again, the Kurds have to be more strategic in addressing these challenges. Do you think a workable power sharing between the Kurds and Arabs is possible in Iraq? I am quite skeptical, but do not see any other workable solution for the short or medium term. It depends upon what types of confidence building measures can be implemented to create a minimal level of trust between the regions. It also depends upon what type of leaders will be in charge in Baghdad. Right now there is Jelal Talabani, Barham Salih, Hoshyr Zibary, Mahmoud Othman, who can defend the interests of the Kurds. The real problem is when the leadership will change some day, and the Kurds lose their positions in the government. But I also want to remain optimistic that some type of power-sharing can work, with the ongoing support and intervention by foreign government, to assist in this project. Would one have ever thought that six years ago the Kurds would have a 7 billion dollar annual budget, or that they could negotiate multi-million dollar projects for their region, or that the region would become one of the most stable and economically viable in the country? This is an outcome of the recognition of the Kurdistan region in a federal Iraq. This form of governance, if it continues and is supported, may allow some form of power-sharing, even in a weakened form. Many believe that the Kurds in the new Iraq lost their golden opportunity because they have tried to reconcile the Shittes and Sunnis instead of fighting for their rights? What do you think? I disagree with this statement entirely. What options did the Kurds have after 2003 – should they have engaged in a war to ‘fight’ for their rights? This is absurd. If you measure the benefits of political stalemate that the Kurds and the Kurdistan region has gained over the past 5 years, because of their willingness to reconcile and be a part of the government, then the answer is clear. The KRG has become a legitimate government and recognized internationally just because of its moderate and compromising position. It has gained economically and politically because of this strategy. I do not see any other realistic choice, as opposition would have destroyed the sixteen years of relative autonomy and recognition they have established for the region. it would be political suicide. How do you see the future of the Kurds in Iraq? You, as an expert in Kurdish issue, what do you prefer to be done by the Kurdish leaders now? The Future of the Kurds is inside the Iraqi state and as an integral part of it. It is not much different than other quasi-states, be it South Ossetia or Abkhazia, because as a political entity, it needs an external patron, international support, and a weak central government for its survival. Thus, this will mean assuring legitimacy from international actors, support from the United States, and revenues to permit a certain level of internal sovereignty. The Kurds will also have to consider their particular geopolitical circumstances and the economics benefits of maintaining open borders and good relations with neighboring states. Again, a cursory look will reveal that their future is part of the Iraq state and not separate from it. Indeed, there is likely to be ongoing struggles for their political autonomy, constitutional rights, revenues, and power. However, the Kurds will have to continue to engage politically and in a peaceful manner, because they have too much to lose if they engage in armed conflict. I believe that the Kurdish leaders are fully aware of this and know they will have to make more compromises in the future. With that said, I also still see the Kurds as important players in Iraq from an economic perspective, and they can play an important role in the economic development and serving as a key gateway for Iraq and into Turkey and Europe. It can become more than a ‘transit zone’ and represent a stable and economically developing region.